1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this essay is to address three objections to the claim that oppression is ‘intersectional’ in nature and how these objections lead to the claim that we should not endorse intersectionality as a theory for examining oppression. While I do not believe the theory is robust enough to be utilized when discussing oppression, I believe there are merits to the theory that will be explored briefly. If oppression was considered intersectional from the standpoint of understanding oppression, it would be a promising theory, however the manner in which intersectionality is utilized causes more issues than it solves.

This essay will follow the structure as follows; a definition of intersectionality, a brief exploration of two merits for the theory, these being its advantages for institutional oppression and the encouragement of coalitions of oppressed identity groups. Lastly, an examination of three objections will follow, these being how the theory has, mostly, rejected class in favor of other identity groups, how the theory can be utilized in an essentialist manner and the consequences of this and the complexity of claiming oppression is intersectional with an example of ‘fat feminism.’

2. DEFINING INTERSECTIONALITY

To define intersectional oppression, it is useful to define oppression, which can be thought of as the unjustifiable placing of a burden on, or the unfair deprivation of goods from, someone or some social group, by interfering with their powers, interests or opportunities.

Whereas intersectional oppression was introduced distinctly in Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 1989 paper, Demarlginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex. This was to expose the limitations of legal institutions to respond effectively to cases involving race and gender. Crenshaw exposed the fact that “…in race discrimination cases, discrimination tends to be viewed in terms of sex or class privileged Blacks; in sex discrimination cases, the focus is on race and class privileged women” (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 139).

She utilizes the analogy of a traffic intersection; discrimination, like traffic running through an intersection, can flow in one direction, and it could flow in another, however if an accident happens, it can be caused by cars traveling from multiple directions and, sometimes, from all of them (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 149). Similarly, if a black woman is discriminated against, because she is in the intersection of oppression, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination or both (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 149). The result being that legal institutions are narrowly tailored to embrace a small set of circumstances, none of which include discrimination against black women (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 151).

Crenshaw wrote further on this subject in her 1991 paper Mapping the Margins in which she further defines intersectionality as a “provisional concept linking contemporary politics with postmodern theory” (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1244). Crenshaw reinforces the postmodern idea that categories like gender and race are socially constructed whilst opening the doors for further categories of oppressed identities to be included into intersectional analyses, adding layer upon layer of complexity to the concept, and the scholarship and activism that utilizes it (Lindsay and Pluckrose, 2020, p. 124).

3. MERITS

Thus far, I have examined how Crenshaw defines intersectionality in her 1989 and 1991 papers. Now, I will examine two merits before exploring three objections.

A. Institution

Institutionally, the theory encourages corporations and various systems (e.g. legal) to view oppression and discrimination in a more sophisticated manner rather than single axis oppression (e.g. discrimination for being female). Instead, it encourages viewing oppression as potentially multi-pronged discriminatory behavior. Thus, in activist terms, it allows for a broader reach (Gordon, 2016, p. 351). Its uses have also been far reaching with the framework being utilized by single-issue causes as well such as fast-food workers fighting for higher wages and various others (Gordon, 2016, p. 352; Philadelphia 15Now!, 2015; Henia, 2014). Further, this approach, institutionally, can have multiple practical approaches (Hill-Collins, 1990, p. 223) for better understanding the narrowness, harmful and discriminatory aspects of legal systems, as Crenshaw outlined in her 1989 paper.

Further the theory portrayed how much more complicated oppressive systems were than the simplistic narrative in which females are the oppressed class and men their oppressors, instead opting for a more complex, intersectional narrative to explore oppression (Lindsay and Pluckrose, 2020, p. 156; Carastathis, 2014, p. 305). Therefore, oppression can be considered intersectional as a better way of understanding oppressive systems.

B. Encourages Coalitions of Groups

A second merit that should be attributed to intersectionality is the nature of the theory encourages coalitions between marginalized identity groups which can be beneficial for change. It is possible for intersectionality to be used as a slogan rather than a theory however, especially within activist groups (Gordon, 2016, p. 352).

Whatever the objections that I will outline below, activist intersectionality has progressed thinking of oppressive systems and oppressed identities.

Intersectionality today calls for recognising and respecting a broader array of identities and causes, bringing together blacks, Latina/os, feminists, lesbians, gays, transgender people and anyone identifying as queer. It is now a slogan that represents a widespread understanding that women are not all alike and that subordinated groups will not accept the suppression of their own identities, interests and priorities. Intersectionality consciousness has delegitimised some of the white and elite assumptions about women and gender – notably, rejecting universalising claims – that characterised some 1970s feminist discourse (Gordon, 2016, p. 354).

Even though intersectionality can be viewed to work against the widespread understanding that marginalized identity groups are alike, it can be viewed as essentialist which creates issues of its own.

4. OBJECTIONS

A. Intersectionality as Essentialist

Intersectionality can be understood as a diversity theory, which would entail its reliance on essentialist assumptions (Gordon, 2016, p. 347). Gordon identifies this in two ways; firstly, intersectionality can be used to identify individual bodies as representative perspectives, assuming, for example, that a female will defend female interests and an African American will defend the interests of black people (Gordon, 2016, p 347). It is understandable that the experience of your identity group will be relatable and influence an individual to support the policies that support their own group (Gordon, 2016, p. 347). Secondly, as Gordon and Jennifer Nash both point out; the focus on representing various categories of people suggests innate homogeneity making efforts to bring representatives of different identities could assume that each person represents her entire identity group (Nash, 2013, p. 4; Gordon, 2016, p. 347). As Emmalon Davis writes; “tagging marginalized individuals as spokespersons perpetuates the myth that the members of nondominant social groups share one monolithic experience” (Davis, 2016, p. 492). The issue with this approach of conceptualizing women as a collective is that any effort to locate these essential attributes has consequences; it could empty the identity category of social meaning by reducing it to the attributes of biology, or it could neglect the variability and diversity of social attributes amongst identity groups such as women (Young, 1994, p. 736).

This essentialist approach seems problematic as to argue via intersectionality, that one individual can represent an entire race, sex, gender, sexuality and various other identities is too general and simplistic. It also rejects liberal policies, policies that spurred forward the Civil Rights Movement in which activists were fighting for our shared humanity, but also for the individual. Intersectionality rather focuses on identity politics and encourages differences via reinforcing identity groups. Some have argued against the discourse of liberal individualism as, according to Young, it denies the reality of groups (Young, 1994, p. 718). According to Young, liberal individualism obscures oppression as without conceptualizing women, for example, as a group in some sense, “…it is not possible to conceptualize oppression as a systematic, structured, institutional process” (Young, 1994, p. 718; Young 1990, chap. 2). This is mistaken, however, as liberal discourse does not argue for the elimination of identity groups, rather that we should be striving to arrive at a place in which these identity groups such as sex, gender, sexuality, race, disability and so on are not a basis for differential treatment. Recognizing that we all have different experiences and what matters is that we be treated as an individual, and not be treated any differently due to our identity such as our race, gender, sexuality etc. seems a more solution-focused approach to tackling and viewing oppression. I am not arguing that people who share identity categories do not have similar experiences, rather that they don’t share all the same experiences and thus, one individual should not speak for an entire identity category. This avoids the essentialist objection by utilizing intersectionality as a way of understanding oppression not a solution.

Another manner in which the theory falls into traps of essentialism is its focus on experiences themselves; “…the metaphor of intersection sometimes suggests that only African-American women can understand their oppression, that, for example, only the disabled can understand disability” (Gordon, 2016, p. 347). Crenshaw notes “not only are women of color in fact overlooked, but their exclusion is reinforced when white women speak for and as women” (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 154). Although this is steering away from essentialist views, it does reinforce the claim that you can only understand the experiences of your own identity and identity intersection. Many theorists encourage this thinking; that white women only examined their own experience as white women during first and second wave feminism and that white women have appropriated intersectionality (Bilge, 2013). This seems contradictory, as on the one hand, people of colour, for example, advocate that deferring to any person of colour on the subject of race is racist, however, it is also racist for a white female to speak about the experiences of black females, on this view (Gordon, 2016, p. 347). This seems to put intersectionality in a bind. However, sociologist Leslie McCall suggests a solution could be to view identity categories provisionally and relationally, rather than essentially; intersectionality should focus more on relationships among identity groups and how they may change instead of focusing on representation solely (McCall, 2005, p. 1785; Gordon, 2016). Gender and other identity groups are relational concepts (Spelman, 1988, p. 170-178; Young, 1994, p. 719) and viewing “the complexity of relationships among multiple social groups within and across analytical categories” (McCall, 2005, p. 1785) could be a solution to the essentialist objection.

B. Example – fat feminism

To illustrate the theory further, I will utilize an example that some theorists have used to portray how oppressions can intersect. These oppressions are discrimination faced due to negative perceptions of obesity and the oppression faced from being female. Fat feminists state that the discrimination faced for being overweight is similar, if not, just as significant as racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia and other identity-based oppressions. Although this field is rooted in the theorizing of sexism, i.e. the pressure in society for women to be slim, it has led to a rejection of objective, medical science; stating objective, medical science that treats obesity as a medical issue and, generally, an unhealthy way of living is discrimination (Boling, 2011; Saguy, 2011; Cooper, 1997). The crucial aspect of race oppression, for example, is that no one chooses their race, so for a group to be oppressed in the same manner, it is crucial that the identity category is that in which someone cannot choose. Whereas, to a certain extent, people have more control of their weight than their race, therefore, the intersection of being obese and female should not be considered, in the same manner, as the intersection of being black and female. This is to be seen as an objection to intersectionality as theorists state something similar to; “we cannot dismantle weight/size oppression without addressing the intersectionality of all oppression” (Lindsay and Pluckrose, 2020, p. 172; ASDAH). Although people may receive unfair discrimination for their weight and this should be addressed, it should perhaps be addressed in a distinct manner in comparison to oppression faced by people who do not choose their marginalized identity. This is one consequence when claiming oppression is intersectional; where can the line be drawn as to who is oppressed and who is not? It creates a notional hierarchy of oppression in which, those at the top, somewhat ironically, are considered the most oppressed and those at the bottom the least. This complexity is an issue as it becomes increasingly difficult to establish who can be considered oppressed and to what extent one identity group is oppressed in comparison to others, forcing a comparative approach to oppression and a reinforcement of identity groups. Thus, for oppression to be considered intersectional, clarity is required to establish the aims of the theory; understanding or activism? The action that’s been taken, thus far, has been problematic as portrayed by fat feminism.

C. The Rejection of Class

Here I will explore the objection of the rejection of class in intersectionality theory. The unemployed and working classes consist of an ever-larger proportion of our populations in the Western world and, critically, they are disproportionately members of other intersecting categories, e.g. young people, people of colour and prisoners (Gordon, 2016, p. 348). Given the rarity of social mobility among the working classes (Butler/Gov.uk, 2020), intersectionality theory may spend less time focusing on class as it is less fluid than other identity categories (Gordon, 2016, p. 348), however, a sole focus on analyses of discourse and power, without exploring class leaves intersectionality as a problematic theory. Focusing, at the very least, partly on economic class is a more solution-focused way of understanding oppression as economic injustice is a significant issue for a significant proportion of people of color and working-class white people as well as many other intersecting identity categories such as gender, disability and problematic drug use. Their poverty and inequality being a considerable influence on their social position, as well as other identity categories (Gordon, 2016, p. 348). The aspects of intersectionality should not warrant an ‘either or’ mindset, in that we can either focus on race disparity or class disparity, especially when these two marginalized identity categories are linked.

I am not suggesting that class is never examined in intersectional conversations, rather that it is rarely considered a crucial aspect of oppression for many intersecting identity groups.

The practical implications of rarely speaking of class or economic position may be driving away working classes from leftist politics towards the right. Whether you see that as a negative or positive depends on your viewpoint but this is still an implication of intersectional conversations. Many already feel disillusioned by intersectional discussions as they are told they are not oppressed as white people or as men. Linda Gordon writes;

Some criticism is ill-informed but understandable nevertheless. A poor white man associates intersectionality with being told that he has white privilege: ‘So when that feminist told me I had “white privilege,” I told her that my white skin didn’t do shit’. He explains: ‘Have you ever spent a frigid northern-Illinois winter without heat or running water? I have. At 12 years old were you making ramen noodles in a coffee maker with water you fetched from a public bathroom? I was’ (Crosley-Corcoran, 2014). A few raise serious, critical questions. A Columbia University student blogger, himself a man of colour, reverses the standard anti-identity-politics critique of intersectionality, arguing that when multiple interest groups have combined, they water down their demands to lowest-common-denominator goals (Ying, 2015; Gordon, 2016, p. 350)

Whereas, if class was part of the conversation, intersectional conversations would be more inclusive rather than exclusive to a select few identity groups. Thus, oppression as intersectional may be a useful theory for understanding oppression but the manner in which it has been applied is problematic.

5. CONCLUSION

Intersectionality is a useful theory for understanding oppressive systems in a more complex manner instead of the binary - men as oppressors and women the oppressed, therefore, oppression should be considered intersectional so we may understand the complexity of oppression. It could encourage coalitions of marginalized identity groups and bring some people together. One way it fails is it may rely on essentialist assumptions which can be damaging. Secondly, it largely rejects class as a legitimate marginalized identity group unless ‘intersected’ with another marginalized identity group. Crenshaw writes “the goal of this activity should be to facilitate the inclusion of marginalized groups” (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 167), I would agree however the inclusion of some should not come at the cost of the exclusion of others. Thus, for oppression to be considered intersectional, the manner in which it is applied needs clarity and inclusivity.

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Gender and Race - Does Intersectionality Do More Harm Than Good?