Political Philosophy - What Account of Justice Ought an Egalitarian Adopt?

To consider an action as just is when it offers each individual equal dignity and respect. This is now considered the conception of substantive, universal, moral equality (Gosepath, 2011). If this is a reliable definition for moral equality, then we should ask what account of justice ought an individual considerably concerned with moral equality (an egalitarian) adopt. If we assume that prioritarianism and sufficientarianism are egalitarian views and are concerned with moral equality, it should be explored which of these two accounts of justice achieves moral equality more effectively and therefore portray which account an egalitarian ought to adopt.

Prioritarianism puts priority for resources to the worst off, therefore “the worse the life of a person who could receive a given benefit, the stronger moral reason we have to confer this benefit on this person” (Otsuka, 2012). This takes into account moral equality and states that we should not strive for general equality but rather, should morally focus our attention on the worst off in a given society, whether this is a more just account for moral equality than sufficientarianism is the basis for this essay.

Sufficientarianism questions the striving for equality as the most morally effective account of justice by exploring the idea that the problem is not that the poor have less than the rich, but that the poor do not have enough—a sufficient level of resources to live a good life or a reasonable prospect of a good life. The suggestion is that sufficiency not equality is what matters (Arneson, 2013). It is argued that sufficientarianism is a form of egalitarianism as it accounts for moral equality, to an extent, by ensuring everyone has the same minimum level of resources.

First, it is imperative to discuss, briefly, why a conversation regarding distributive justice is worthy and the most effective method to organise society fairly. Distributive justice refers to the distribution of resources in the most just manner. Accounts which attempt to distribute resources and respect in the most just manner are therefore best thought of as providing moral guidance for the political processes and structures that affect the distribution of benefits and burdens in societies (Lamont & Favor,  2017). Accounts which offer this kind of moral guidance on distribution should be thought of as principles of distributive justice (Lamont & Favor, 2017).

An egalitarian wants equality of some sort i.e. people should get the same, be treated the same, or be treated as equals, in some respect (Arneson, 2013). Therefore, a strict egalitarian favours equality at all costs, thus everyone receives the same resources, respect and treatment. On the surface, moral equality looks promising as a society in which there is unjust inequality for no moral or satisfactory reason is worrisome. There are plausible distributive theories that could, if implemented make societies more morally equal and less unjust without simply striving for equality at all costs. This brings with it the question of whether these accounts are egalitarian, which for the purposes of this essay, we shall assume they are.

…moral equality can be understood as prescribing treatment of persons as equals, i.e., with equal concern and respect, and not the often implausible principle of treating persons equally (Gosepath, 2011; Dworkin, 1977).

The strict egalitarian believes the most just manner to distribute resources is for everyone to be distributed the exact same resources. This already seems implausible as simply valuing a diminution of the gap between the better and worse off for its own sake does not seem to be the most just manner of distributing resources (Clayton & Williams, 2002) as resources and each individual’s needs are both relative, thus not everyone should receive the exact same treatment.  Instead, the two accounts of justice explored here focus more on the moral aspects of equality rather than closing the gap between the best and worst off. Aristotle and many others spoke of justice involving the idea of proportional treatment, which insinuates recipients should receive unequal amounts of whatever good is at issue (Aristotle, 2000; Miller, 2017; Gosepath, 2011).

If A is twice as deserving or twice as needy as B, justice may require that she receives more than B does. So here formal equality of treatment – the same rule applied to both – leads to an unequal outcome (Aristotle, 2000; Miller, 2017).

Instead of treating every person exactly the same with the exact same resources without considering the needs of the individual, a better form of treatment of others or distribution is proportional or relatively equal when it treats all relevant persons in relation to their due (Aristotle, 2000; Plato, 1997; Gosepath, 2011). 

A scenario to illustrate this could be that Jeff has asthma and needs to use an inhaler throughout the day, whereas Mary does not. Strict egalitarians would state that both Jeff and Mary should receive an inhaler regardless of who needs to use one in order to achieve equality. 

Just as a specific resource needs to be considered relatively, the individual these resources are given to should also be considered. This introduces prioritarianism, which takes into account who is most in need.

Prioritarianism

If you were at an all-time low in your life; you’ve lost your home, you’re living on the street and you’ve become addicted to a harmful drug such as heroin, you should be prioritised. You would be helped up out of poverty and receive help for your addiction. This is ideally how prioritarianism should be applied, in my view. In a situation that only allows for two specific changes to the distribution of resources, one change would bring those who are better of than you, in the scenario above, down to your level; everyone is equal but homeless and addicted to heroin. The second, the alternative, would prioritise those who are the worst off like you and bring them not necessarily to the same level as the better off, but better than before. Strict egalitarians would prefer the former to achieve equality. It would seem to me that the latter is preferable as it takes into account moralequality as some are better off rather than making some worse off. 

If we are aiming for equality, we should, morally, think that it’s more important to benefit those who are worse off, since these benefits reduce inequality as a result (Parfit, 1997). Even though Parfit distinguishes between the priority view as not strictly concerning equality or relational aspects of distribution, for the sake of this exploration, I will consider prioritarianism an egalitarian view which does reduce inequality and therefore concerns moral equality. 

The priority view holds not in a comparative distribution of resources but rather in benefitting those who need them, regardless of their relation to others. If there was, for example, a sole individual in need, prioritarianism would regard help to this individual. If there were two individuals, one better off than the other, the urgency to prioritise the worse off is significant, regardless of whether the two are aware of each other or regardless of how much better off one is, in a comparative sense (Parfit, 1997). 

One benefit to this view is it does not fall victim to the Levelling Down Objection, in which a strict egalitarian would prefer to bring those better off down to the level of the worst off for the sake of equality, if the situation only allowed that change. Prioritarianism would, in my view, not adhere to this because, in this situation, it makes no one better off but a significant proportion worse off. Prioritarianism should only be concerned with those who need resources, so in the scenario in which the only option is to make some worse off, no action would be required. This account, it could be argued, is morally superior to the alternative of making some worse off.

An objection to prioritarianism comes in the form of practicality. How is it decided who to benefit or who is in need? What criteria has to be met (or not met) in order for an individual to be prioritised? This issue concerns subjectivity in that once these questions are asked, it becomes increasingly difficult to decipher who is deserving of priority and benefit. Inevitable uproar would develop if we put priority on problem drug users or prisoners, however some could argue they are more deserving or are worse off than the homeless for example. This objection surrounds different forms of luck. Option luck regards the choices individuals make which could be assigned to drug users as some would argue problem drug users made a choice to use drugs and therefore the reasons for their being worse off was not out of their hands (Wikman-Svahn and Lindblom, 2018). Others ascribe to determinism, which would state they were determined to use drugs due to external forces out-with their control and it would then be morally just to prioritise them. This could also be defined as brute luck which concerns events out-with an individual’s control (Dworkin, 2000; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2018) such as being born with a genetic defect. However, with regards to prioritarianism, it is difficult to distinguish between what constitutes brute luck and option luck, leading to the issue of who should be prioritised first. This issue is also raised now with discussions of who should receive treatment for COVID-19. Prioritising the worst-off would be, mostly, the old and frail. Is prioritising those nearer the end of their lives the most just distribution of resources? A young person who is suffering greatly, perhaps not as greatly as an elderly person, still has the majority of her life ahead of her (Jaziri & Alnahdi, 2020). Thus, prioritarianism may not be the most moral account of justice. This major issue of who is prioritised first is an objection that prioritarianism has yet to convincingly fix. 

However, some solutions can be briefly explored here such as focusing purely on economic means as a starting point. Although another question would be raised as to who is morally deserving of economic benefit. If, for example, we could only provide economic benefit to one person, either Jade or David, David being a heroin addict and Jade being homeless, who would we choose? Those who are economically worse off could be prioritised, however moral choice must be answered for to distinguish who is prioritised first. Issues also arise as to how much aid or resources is sufficient for those worst off to survive or have a generally decent standard of living.

Sufficientarianism

This leads to the theory regarding sufficiency. Instead of debating over who is the worst off or who, morally, should be prioritised, perhaps in order to achieve a more just distribution and therefore a more moral level of equality, ensuring that everyone has enough is more just. Sufficientarians claim that ensuring enough of some goods is of significant importance (Shields, 2012). 

There are two theses that best describe, in practical terms, how this distributive theory would work. “The positive thesis stresses the importance of people living above a certain threshold, free from deprivation” (Casal, 2007; Huseby 2009). This seems to ascribe more to moral equality as everyone would be relatively equal in that all would be above a specific threshold. The negative thesis holds that once somebody is above this threshold, their benefits are more arbitrary than those below it (Casal,  2007).

However, problems arise when we discuss the lower threshold, too high and not everyone can cross that line, too low and everyone is in relative deprivation. Crisp defends sufficiency by speaking of a threshold of well-being such that a benevolent impartial observer would feel compassion towards people who are below this threshold (Crisp, 2003; Benbaji, 2006). However, this seems incredibly arbitrary and subjective. An impartial observer is nearly impossible to obtain. Every individual will have an opinion based on experience, thus one person may see a group of people as living well, whereas another would believe they are not and that the threshold should be raised to accommodate this.

Perhaps, Huseby’s two thresholds can alleviate this issue. He proposes that there is a level of well-being, the lower threshold, such that it is especially, morally important that people reach it (Huseby, 2020). If someone falls below this line, then they should be prioritised. This looks similar to prioritarianism but with more focus on equality. It can be assumed then that this lower threshold surrounds the idea of having enough, therefore this should concern basic needs such as food, water, shelter and anything else needed to survive in a relative sense. Although, there are issues with a lower threshold when we introduce issues such as disability and disease. The threshold would, practically, be difficult to implement as some have greater needs in order to survive than others, so this is not just an issue of economics but needs and care.

A second, higher threshold, Huseby holds would be a level of well-being such that above it, justice concerns do not arise, and such that those below have priority over those above it (Huseby, 2020). This threshold is even more difficult to set due to the subjectivity of having enough. Richard Arneson stated this objection;

One difficulty is how one non arbitrarily sets the threshold level. Why here and not higher or lower? What we have is a smooth continuum of possible levels of overall capability for flourishing. ... I do not see how any unique level (not even a broad thick line) can be picked out such that if a person has that level, she had ‘enough’ (Arneson, 2000).

This, in my view, concerns more the higher threshold as it is objectively easier to set a lower threshold. Having enough to survive is a more objective term than having enough to be content. What one might believe to be what they need to be content is different to what another might believe. 

However, some form of higher threshold would, it can be argued, concern moral equality more as everyone would be considered regardless of who’s better off or worse off. Whereas, if we are purely discussing the morally right action, it still seems prioritising the worst off is more justified. If everyone was over the threshold and therefore content, prioritarianism states that we should still focus our attention on the worst off. Thus, we will always be improving. The chain is only as strong as its weakest link. 

Shields’ Shift Thesis looks more promising in that it accounts for the subjectivity of each individual’s needs. “Once people have secured enough there is a discontinuity in the rate of change of the marginal weight of our reasons to benefit them further” (Shields, 2012). In other words, we all have different needs to be content or to survive and so we all would have different thresholds. “Those who have not secured enough can call on the weight of more and different reasons than those who have secured enough” (Shields, 2012). This brings with it a new issue of determining what reasons would account for moral weight to benefit an individual further. However, this thesis is not vulnerable to the variety of requirements for survival of individuals with disabilities for example. It sounds like we would be prioritising the worst off in this manner. The worst off would require various reasons to shift their benefits further, whereas those who have enough, or the better off, would not have sufficient reasons for further benefit. 

Concluding Remarks

For these reasons, it would appear to me that prioritarianism is a more moral account of justice. However, the question posed is what account of justice ought an egalitarian, who would be most concerned with moral equality, adopt? In my view the account which achieves moral equality more effectively is sufficientarianism, more specifically, Shields’ Shift Thesis for sufficiency. It accounts for equality more so than prioritarianism, in that everyone would, in theory, have enough and thus be more equal. It also accounts for morality in that it still prioritises the worst off by accounting for various reasons for further benefit that the worst off have. Whether these two accounts of justice can be acknowledged as egalitarian is another argument, one in which the answer is to a different question.

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